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DISCONTENT WITH PUBLIC UTILITY
RATE REGULATION
TAYLOR E. GRONINGER*

Despite the propaganda of certain "hired" lecturers, professors, educators, newspapers and educational agencies, there
is throughout our country widespread discontent with the rate
regulation of public utilities.
This discontent is chiefly traceable in its final analysis to
four items in the bill of complaint, namely: (1) Politics, (2)
Avarice on the part of owners, managers and operators, (3)
Incapability of Regulatory bodies and Municipalities to protect
the public's interest in the property devoted to public service and
(4) The ease of Judicial Interference with Rate Orders.
With respect to politics: Without being told by chemist or
ambulance driver, the rate paying public know that politics
and public regulation of utilities mix with the same adhesiveness
as water and oil, and with the same harmony as gasoline and
white mule. Some examples of such admixture are fresh in
mind.
In an adjoining State, a few months ago, utility regulation
was given an overdose of politics. The whole country was
shocked, though the wire through which the dose was administered was heavily INSULATED.
The adjoining State is overwhelmingly Republican. A large
utility operator's contribution in a political campaign was
$237,925. Of this amount, $125,000 was given to the campaign
fund of the Republican candidate for United States Senator.
Now for the shock-the candidate at the time was the chairman
of the rate making body of the state!
In this same campaign, this same utility operator gave to the
Democratic Senatorship candidate's campaign fund $15,000.
Being interested in selecting a "vigorous" prosecutor he contributed $5,000 to the campaign fund of a candidate for State's
Attorney; in order that an "upright" tax commissioner might be
chosen, he contributed $20,000 for that purpose; believing in the
protection of the "infant" industries of this country, he contributed $10,000 to the secretary of the G. 0. P. National Committee; and because of his "abhorrence" for a league of nations
*See p. 270 for biographical note.
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or a world court, he gave $32,925 for spreading anti-world-court
propaganda. For other political purposes, he contributed until
the total amount so used by this political-utility-philanthropist
from his "cash drawer" was $237,925.
Shock number two-The contributions to the successful
United States Senator's primary contest totaled $458,782 of
which sum $203,000 was given by public utilities' officials!
Such political condition is a breeder of discontent and causes
even the man of but little gray matter to think with Shakespeare "there's something rotten in the state of Denmark."
Such a condition should cause the whole nation to remember
the old railway danger signal of "Stop, look and listen"; while
these lines by Goldsmith become very appropos:
"Ill fares the land, to hastening ills a prey,
Where wealth accumulates, and men decay."

In another adjoining state, in September, 1928, two prominent politicians-one a Democrat, the other a Republican,entered pleas of guilty in a circuit court to the charge of violating the state's lobbying law and paid fines of $250 with
costs. These eminent gentlemen had engaged in public-utility
lobbying in the Kentucky legislature.
In our own state, where you may find everything on the calendar that is both good and bad in politics, it is a matter not of
slander but of shamefully common knowledge that Public
Utilities have exercised a bi-partisan lobby control of legislative
action during the past two sessions of our law makers. It is but
mild exaggeration to say that the "Third house" had a larger
membership than either the house or senate; and it is certainly
no exaggeration to say that the "variety" of the third house
equalled that of both the house and senate.
We all know of the evils of certain kinds of lobbying; that it
costs money to maintain the "third house"; and we further
know that all "operating" expenses are finally paid by the rate
payer, whether they be of the usual or unusual kind.
Will not some fair minded utility owner or operator of Indiana
start a movement to cut the representation in the "third house"
of the 1929 legislature?
The second item in the bill of discontent named above it avarice on the part of owners, managers, and operators. And in
fairness to the business, the writer does not mean to say that
all those who conduct public utility business are looking for
the lion's share. Such is not the case.
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But there are many owners and managers who fail to appreciate that public service corporations are created for public purposes; that they derive their existence and powers from the
state; that they perform a function of the state; and that they
are permitted to be organized for the public good, as well as
for the pucuniary profit of stockholders.
Such owners and managers stop at nothing to take advantage
of the rate payers. Through the use of "high powered" appraisal engineers, "nationally known" economists, "skilled"
forecasters and accounting analyists and "able" lawyers they
lay claim to inflated values for their properties; and with the
further aid of "conservative" bankers they ask for the highest
return obtainable.
Such owners seem to forget that all they have a right to ask
under the law is only a fair return on the fair value of the property used in the service of the public.
A fair return is a reasonable return and not
a speculative
profit; and the fair value of the property is not an inflated value
but that value, which under all the facts and circumstances
surrounding the utility is reasonable and equitable, having
regard for the special rights, privileges and advantages which
the public through regulatory laws confer upon public service
property and public service business.
The third item which causes discontent with regulation is the
incapability of public officials to safeguard the public's right
in regulation.
The large public utilities believe in preparedness. They have
their attorneys, appraisal engineers, accountaints and other
experts, who are schooled and qualified in their respective lines.
When needed before commission or court they are prepared to
present their side of the case and to furnish the kind of proof
that wins favorable orders and decisions.
On the other hand, it frequently happens that members of
our regulatory bodies are appointed as reward for political services rendered without regard to their qualifications or fitness
and such bodies often lack efficient appraisal engineers and accountants; while of municipalities it may be said their city
attorneys are not familiar with utility law decisions and are
without engineering or accounting assistance.
In brief, those who are representing the public utility regulation are not as a rule trained and equipped as are those who
represent the utility. The result is that the utility wins its
contention in most every important contest; especially in court
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where cases are decided according to the evidence in the record
as well as the established rules of law.
The fourth item of discontent is judicial interference with
rate regulation.
Within the past few years so many rate orders have been
overthrown by the courts, particularly by the Federal courts,
that there has arisen throughout the country much antagonism
to court review of regulatory orders.
In defense of most courts' action in this matter it should be
said that courts decide cases in the light of the evidence in the
records before them; and it is a matter of common knowledge
that in most regulatory cases only the utility's side is presented
with any degree of proficiency.
But on the other hand, within the past five or six years, there
seems to be a tendency on the part of the Federal Statutory
courts in many Districts, and of the United States Supreme
Court, also, to lessen the range of legislative discretion in rate
making and to give dominance to but one of the so-called "relevant" facts named in Smyth v. Ames in determining the rate
base, namely, Reproduction cost.
Furthermore, it seems so easy for many courts to hold that
any rate of return, on property clothed with a monopoly privilege
and other valuable rights, under 7 or 9% is confiscatory.
What is the remedy for this situation? We suggest the
following:
(1) There should be an absolute divorcement of politics
from utility regulation. This may be had by an aroused electorate electing honest and capable public officials.
(2) The avarice of greedy owners, managers and operators
should be curbed. This may be done through commission orders
and court decisions, provided Regulatory bodies and municipalities meet the evidence offered by the utilities and furnish evidence of equal probative value as that produced by the utilities at commission hearings and trials before courts.
(3) Incapable Regulatory officials should be supplanted by
capable ones. At least half or three-fourths of the members of
regulatory bodies should be lawyers or men specially schooled
in public utility law since practically every commission order
of any consequence involves many law questions. Furthermore,
a first class appraisal engineer who is able to meet the "high
powered" utility engineer and a competent accountant should
be connected with every commission.
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(4) A lawyer, specially qualified in utility law, should represent the public before the regulatory body. Such lawyer
should be elected or appointed by the Attorney General of the
State in order to assure his independence of action.
(5)
The municipalities of our country should be aroused to
the importance of looking after their own and the interests of
their inhabitants in all utility matters affecting them. Generally speaking, at the present time, no one is chargeable with
the care of utility matters in our municipalities and no one is
prepared for action.
Yet there is no single matter in which our municipalities and
their inhabitants are more vitally interested than that of utility
regulation.
For example--During the year 1927, the civil City of Indianapolis, including the Park Department, paid for water services
$422,200.00, for electric services $394,926.00, and for gas service $14,235.00-a total of $831,361.00.
The aggregate amount of these utility service bills to the city
alone-better than three quarters of a million dollars annually,
must impress one with the importance of utility rate regulation
to the City. And yet the City of Indianapolis has no public
utilities department.
The City has its Board of Works, its Zoning Board, its Sanitary Board, its Board of Health, its Board of Safety, its Building Inspector, its City Engineer with a large corps of assistants to care for the streets and alleys, but so far as utility services are concerned, just one of all the city officials gives any
particular attention to them-the City Controller-he pays the
bills. This is a fine tribute to the intelligence of the City's citizenry and a glowing testimonial to the advancement in municipal
government.
What is true of Indianapolis respecting the City's preparedness to care for its own interests and its inhabitants' interests
in rate making is true of most of the cities of America.
(6) The courts of our country should exercise their power
to overthrow rate orders only in the clearest of cases; they
should more closely scrutinize appraisal engineers' "shadows"
and accountants' "foliage" in making their estimates of values;
and should consider the large advantages enjoyed by public
utility business, with its protected monopoly, in passing on the
reasonable rate of return.
While the courts should not hesitate to overthrow regulatory
orders, on constitutional grounds, when such orders clearly vio-
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late constitutional guaranties, they should not forget that rate
making is purely a legislative function and is no function of
the courts.
The respect due to legislative authority from the judicial is
well expressed in San Diego Land & T. Co. v. National City,'
wherein the court said:
"Judicial interference should never occur unless the case presents, clearly
and beyond all doubt, such a flagrant attack upon the rights of property
under the guise of regulation as to compel the court to say that the rates
prescribed will necessarily have the effect to deny just compensation for
private property taken for the public use."

In addition to the foregoing, the writer is of the opinion
that we shall continue to have discontent with utility regulation throughout the country, particularly with rate making,
until some more definite method of determining the rate base
is established than that now pfevailing.
As things now are, the rate base is the present "fair value"
of the property used in the public service and the rate of return
is a "fair return." Both fair value and fair return are matters
of dispute and will continue to be so long as human opinions
and judgments vary.
Could we not more closely approach that which is economically
and legally sound in rate making if the United States Supreme
Court would discard the old uncertain and indefinite fair value
rule of Smyth v. Ames and in its stead hold that what a public
service corporation under legislative sanction is entitled to ask
is a fair return on the bona fide cost of the property or the "Prudent Investment"?
The Prudent Investment is easily determined and would give
a rate base that is stable; while if the purchasing power of the
dollar fluctuates, it would be a simple matter to increase or
decrease the rate of return to take care of such fluctuation.
With a stable rate base method, such as prudent investment
would afford and the only varible the rate of return, rate making by public authority would become a comparatively easy matter; millions of dollars in rate case expenditures would be saved
annually to the rate payers; long delays in rate case investigations and court trials would be avoided; confusion in commission orders and court decisions would disappear; and the discontent on the part of the public in general which now exists
would give way to confidence in public regulation.
1174 U. S. 739, 754.

